The study of the history and origins of support for Al Qaeda in Southeast Asia is highly relevant in the contemporary world. From a study of the rationale and motive of such groups, we can arrive at the security implications for the Australian government and the preventative measures that could be taken to thwart any possible terrorist attacks.
To begin with, the term ‘terrorist organization’ should not be interpreted to mean a formal hierarchy of personnel who are assigned fixed responsibilities and duties. On the other hand they imply propaganda and support mechanism whose aim is to recruit willing individuals from the Islamic world to participate in the holy war, also known as ‘Jihad’. Consistent with this fact, the term ‘Al Qaeda’ was not Christened by Osama bin Laden; rather, it was the United States intelligence agency CIA that referred to the Islamic activists led by bin Laden in this manner in the mid-1990s. Al Qaeda, translated from Arabic, literally means a “foundation or precept’. The term Jemaah Islamiyah, a terrorist outfit that has its roots in Southeast Asia is translatable into “Islamic community” (Shuja, 2006, p.447). Hence, the employment of terrorism is not an intrinsic aspect of these organizations. Terrorism is only a tactic that was adopted during the last decade or so, but there is nothing inevitable about it. This fact should be kept in mind by Australian security agencies, while drawing awareness campaigns and security measures, for far too often western intelligence tends to portray these Islamic groups to indulge in terrorist activities for terror’s sake. This is not true. The Jihadists’ objective is to defend their faith and their way of life, which they feel is threatened by the western cultural and military interventions in the Islamic world (and there is sufficient proof to support this assertion).
To understand how Al Qaeda gained support in Southeast Asia, it is important to gain cognisance of its founding principle, i.e. Al Qaeda was founded on universal Islamic precepts of jihad and brotherhood. And the present wave of Islamic revivalism and the rise of Islamic fundamentalism in Southeast Asia originated during the 1970s. The movement started as a reaction to the disillusionment and failure associated with modern neo-liberal economic policies. The first world has had longstanding association with Muslim-dominant nations that are oppressive, authoritarian and dictatorial. A prime example of this would be Saudi Arabia, with whom the United States and its allies (including Australia) don’t seem to have a problem, in spite of copious evidence of severe human rights violations within its borders (Smith, 2002, p.34). This apparent hypocrisy of the west had induced a sense of discontent and anger within the wider Islamic community. That is when influential Muslim thinkers such as like Hassan al-Banna and Sayyid Qutb involved themselves in social activism, which later spawned militant outfits like the Al Qaeda and Jemaah Islamiah. This point is illustrated succinctly in the following passage:
“Islamic radicalism in Southeast Asia is not a sudden and recent phenomenon. In reality, it has been in the making for more than 20 years; its roots originate in events in the Middle East, the effects of which have reverberated worldwide. This in turn was facilitated by the impact of globalization and technological advancement. However, the catalytic role played by Al-Qaeda, especially since the early 1990s, is perhaps the single most significant factor in the global terrorist threat confronting the world today.” (De Castro, 2004, p.194)
To gain a deeper understanding of the rise of Islamic militancy in Southeast Asia, we need to delve into its instigating causes. The first and the seemingly perennial of the three is the Israel-Palestine conflict. Ever since the installation of Israel in 1948, a status of second-class citizenship was imposed on the native Arab Muslims in the region. American interference in Iran, where it deposed democratically elected government and handed over the reigns to the Shah. The subsequent dilution in Islamic values in Iran as a result of Shah’s inclination toward modernity and his apathy toward declining economic conditions had enraged Iranians – a radical section within its population has pledged participation in Jihad. And thirdly, when the United States and the erstwhile Soviet Union played out their Cold war conflict in Afghanistan, its people felt “used and exploited” by the hegemonic western powers (Smith, 2002, p.33). These blatant political indiscretions on part of the First World and the more subtle cultural imperialism in the form of capitalism and material consumerism have provided sound rationale for organizations such as Al Qaeda (in Afganistan and the Middle East) and Jemaah Islamiah (in Southeast Asia) to fight for their right to self-determination. Any action on part of the Australian government to tighten security should be historically informed. Otherwise, the primary causes for Islamic militancy will continue to provide more emotional and intellectual fodder for violent responses (De Castro, 2004, p.194).
The key to the support of outfits such as Al Qaeda in Southeast Asia is the underlying common Islamic precept shared by its people. The various Islamist terror groups across the world are not distinguishable by ideology, for they all claim to fight for Islam in their respective regions. The following passage explains how Osama bin Laden was able to bring together people of different ethnic and national identities under his leadership:
“The potency of Al-Qaeda rests in its ability to channel the Islamic forces it inspires. More than any other leader before him, Osama bin Laden has been able to unify radical Islam and to focus its rage. However, Osama’s success must be seen in the context of two parallel historical developments–namely, the polarization of Islamic extremist forces coinciding with a broader current of increasing religious orthodoxy and the politicization of the ‘ummah’ (Islamic community) throughout the world. These phenomena have been going on for more than the last 20 years.” (De Castro, 2004, p.194)
A powerful leader such as bin Laden was able to successfully franchise Islamic Jihad to a broad range of local Muslims, each with their own unique history of suffering and grievances. Hence, there is an aspect of fluidity in the locations/regions in which various units operate. Jemaah Islamiah was initially founded in Singapore, but now has spread its tentacles to other parts of South East Asia. It now poses the greatest threat to Australian interests. But even Jemaah Islamiah was inspired by Osama bin Laden and in that sense all these terrorist groups with different labels are essentially the same for all practical purposes. In other words, the common mandate provided by Osama bin Laden–a broad based jihad against the enemies of Islam–facilitates these outfits to persevere with their domestic struggles, but is contained within the broader global cause, namely, the defence of Islam. In Southeast Asia, some important groups that came under the influence of Al-Qaeda, include “the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG), the KMM, and Jemaah Islamiah” (Brimley, 2006, p.30).
It is obvious from the array of facts presented above that the best way forward for policy makers in Canberra is to sever strategic alliance with the United States and focus its energies on mending ties with its South East Asian neighbours. The South East Asia region has a large Muslim population. Indonesia is a thriving centre for Islamic scholarship and practice. But unfortunately, Australia had sided with the oppressive Suharto regime and had tacitly aided injustice in the past. The Muslims in the region have every reason to feel aggrieved. What Australia needs to do is to keep its intelligence gathering efforts to a minimum and focus its energies on reaching out to its neighbours. Travel warnings and terror alerts cannot be more than superficial attempts to protect Australian citizens. A real change in the threat of terror will only come about when economic opportunism and imperialist ambition is replaced with humanitarian concern and noble statesmanship. The Australian indifference to Muslim causes goes back many decades, but the tensions have escalated post September 11, 2001:
“Southeast Asia–home to more than 250 million Muslims and to the largest Islamic country in the world (Indonesia) –has experienced a perceptible intensification of Islamic militancy after September 11, 2001. The futility of the US-led war in Iraq and the failure of the “coalition of the willing” (that includes Australia) to secure UN approval to attack Iraq have heightened Islamic animosity in the region and across the Muslim world” (Bellamy, 2004, p.155).
As the Australian government draws up plans to redress the threat of terror, it should also keep in mind that the electorate is increasingly gaining a broader awareness of geo-political situations. It can no longer hope that conventional policy frameworks (that were essentially based on imperialist lines) will get electoral approval. A good example of discerning electorate can be found in Spain. In spite of the Aznar government’s official propaganda, its citizens threw Aznar and his cohorts out of power, in light of the Madrid bombings (Shuja, 2006, p.447). This suggests that the Spanish populace is aware of the connection between Spain’s involvement in the war on terror and the Madrid bombings; they also knew if they had distanced themselves from the masters in Washington they could have avoided this tragedy. The Australian government can learn from the Spanish example. This sentiment is also expressed by John Lee, a respected political commentator, thus:
“The idea that geopolitical strategies should be polluted by a crude popular fear of attack, and that gangs of outlaws should influence democracies, may be abhorrent. But the grisly truth is that poor people in Iraq and Afghanistan have achieved a kind of equality with rich westerners. Both now know fear. Our lives may soon prove as cheap as theirs. That is the progress made so far in the war on terror.” (Lee, 2007, p.602)
The closest act of terrorism near Australian soil was the Bali bombing of October 2002. This was interpreted by some commentators as the Jihadists’ way of warning Australia and deterring it in collaborating with the United States. But unfortunately, the message was ignored by the Australian government, putting its citizens at ever greater risk. Bali might not be officially Australian soil, but with the organization and skill with which the Islamic militants operate, it might not be long before Australia is made to pay for its ill advised alliance with imperialists further north (Abuza, 2003, p.170). The policy makers in Canberra should also remind themselves of the Bali bombings and its causes. The Establishment press, most of it owned or controlled by Rupert Murdoch and keen on promoting its own interests had presented a blanket view in its Bali reports. For example, the Australian mainstream media wants its citizens to believe that the terror attack in the Indonesian island was a sequel to the campaign of hatred against western way of life that was kick-started with September 11 attacks. But this view-point is not accurate. If only the Australian press will see the attacks as an act of retaliation against Australia for its alliance with the United States, its citizens can have more peaceful holidays (Bellamy, 2004, p.154).
Australian authorities should remember a crucial distinction, if they are to succeed in their attempts to prevent Islamist militancy, namely that the role of leaders of terror networks is secondary to their message. For instance, even when Al Qaeda’s leader in Iraq Abu Musab al-Zarqawi was assassinated, there was no cessation in the local insurgency. Similarly, there is no conclusive evidence that Osama bin Laden is alive, yet the numbers of terror attacks targeted at western interests have seen an unprecedented rise since the events of September 11. Also, the Southeast Asian region is populated by numerous militant Islamist outfits, whose ideologies are nearly the same. The threat posed to Australian interests in Southeast Asia comes from small and marginalized groups who are spread all across the region. Alongside Jemaah Islamiah (JI) in Malaysia, Singapore, and Indonesia; “we have the Kumpulan Mujahidin Malaysia; and al-Maunah in Malaysia; the Abu Sayaff in the southern Philippines; Pattani United Liberation Organization in southern Thailand; and Laskar Jihad, Majlis Mujahideen, and Islamic Defenders’ Front in Indonesia.” Hence the security measures taken by the Australian government should not confine itself to a particular militant entity, but should focus on the broader phenomenon of global Jihad. Given this backdrop, the best way forward is for Australia to rethink its responsibility toward its neighbours. Attempts at providing its citizens with travel warnings and probability of terror attacks are short sighted and ineffective in bringing peace and harmony to the region in particular and the world in general (Chehab, 2006, p.37).
References:
Abuza, Zachary., “Funding Terrorism in Southeast Asia: The Financial Network of Al Qaeda and Jemaah Islamiya.” Contemporary Southeast Asia 25, no. 2 (2003): 169+.
Bellamy, Alex J. “Terrorism, Freedom and Security: Winning without War.” The Australian Journal of Politics and History 50, no. 1 (2004): 153+.
Brimley, Shawn. “Tentacles of Jihad: Targeting Transnational Support Networks.” Parameters 36, no. 2 (2006): 30+.
Chehab, Zaki. “Al-Qaeda: Still a Step Ahead; Why the Organisational Skills of Osama Bin Laden and His Deputy Ayman Al-Zawahiri Continue to Outwit the West.”, New Statesman, July 3, 2006, 37.
Mutalib, Hussin. “Misunderstood: Political Islam in Southeast Asia.”, Harvard International Review 28, no. 2 (2006): 84+.
Smith, Paul J. “Transnational Terrorism and the Al Qaeda Model: Confronting New Realities.” Parameters 32, no. 2 (2002): 33+.
De Castro, Renato Cruz. 2004. Addressing International Terrorism in Southeast Asia: A Matter of Strategic or Functional Approach?. Contemporary Southeast Asia 26, no. 2: 193+.
Lee, John. 2007. Issues in Australian Foreign Policy January to June 2007. The Australian Journal of Politics and History 53, no. 4: 600+.
Pilger, John. 2002. For 40 Years, Australian Governments Have Colluded with State Terrorism in Indonesia. Now the Bali Outrage Allows John Howard to Distract Attention from His Hypocrisy., New Statesman, October 21, 11+. .
Shuja, Sharif. 2006. Terrorism in Southeast Asia: Australia’s Security Threat and Response. Contemporary Review, Winter, 445+. .
Snyder, Craig A. 2006., Southeast Asian Perceptions of Australia’s Foreign Policy. Contemporary Southeast Asia 28, no. 2: 322+. .