‘United States Foreign Policy from 1945- 1991 was overwhelmingly concerned with USSR’. Explain.

Yes, the foreign policy of the United States has been predominantly concerned with the balance of power with USSR from 1945 to 1991. The rest of this essay will present facts and arguments in support of this assertion. Right through its history, America has not hesitated to use force under the pretexts of principles, sovereignty and justice. American military intervention in world affairs has risen drastically since the end of the Second World War. The period following the Second World War saw America assume the role of a superpower that headed the western coalition in what was a bipolar world. American Presidents presiding over some key events in history, such as the Cuban Missile Crisis, The Cold War, The Vietnam War, etc., were hindered from acting as public representatives due to pressure from the military industrial complex. John Kennedy, Lyndon Johnson, Ronald Reagan, George Herbert Walker Bush and George W. Bush – all of them were subject to these opposing interests. But eventually, the corporate-government nexus proved too powerful; and in this sense American Presidents after the Second World War were largely restricted and powerless to uphold their higher personal values. Most of the strategic moves on part of the United States after the end of the Great War were directly in response to anticipated threat from the other superpower the USSR. In 1947, Great Britain, still reeling under the aftermath of World War Two, decided to transfer its control of Palestine to the United Nations. The United Nations' Special Committee on Palestine (UNSCOP) made a few recommendations. One of it is to partition Palestine. This was later adopted under UN Resolution 181, which also included a plan to allocate Greater Jerusalem as a common international area. This was never acceptable to the Palestinians and it resulted in a war shortly afterwards. The period between 1949 and 1956 saw tensions escalate in the region as Jordan, Egypt and Syria endeavoured to protect their respective borders from an Israeli invasion. In spite of negotiations by the UN to prevent armed conflict, in February 1955, Israel invaded the Gaza Strip in Egypt. The then Egyptian President Nasser, alarmed at his army’s incompetence approached the West for assistance, which they promptly refused. This left Egypt with no other option than to turn to the Soviet Union for military support. The ramifications of the Cold War soon spread into the Middle East. The West did not want the oil-rich region to fall to communism and to negate Soviet influence over the region; the United States increased its foothold in the Middle East. The big prize for the West would be Palestine. Although the area of land comprising Palestine was relatively small, it nevertheless was strategically located stretching along the eastern coast of the Mediterranean Sea and located between the Middle East and Northern Africa. Hence, the U.S. intervention in Middle Eastern affairs has a big element of self-interest in it. The Jewish migration to Palestine saw a sharp increase in the decades after world war one. The population increased from 65,000 in 1919 to 650,000 by 1947. This deluge of humanity usurped lands traditionally belonging to the Palestinians, which angered the latter. In the mean time, President Truman accepted the stipulations put forward by the Peel Royal War Commission Report in the year 1937. However, due to the perceived unjustness of the partition, it was not implemented. Since the relationship between U.S.S.R. and Egypt posed a threat to American strategic interests, Britain and France partnered Israel in invading Egypt in the October of 1956, which resulted in the Suez Crisis. Although Israel occupied the Sinai Peninsula and Gaza strip, President Eisenhower pressurized that it retract its troops from these lands. Eventually, Israel acquiesced to the demands. This was a singular event when Israel succumbed to diplomatic pressure from America. In his farewell address to the citizens of his nation, American President Dwight Eisenhower chose to dwell on one particular aspect of the American economic system. Those were the years following the Second World War and the United States was waging a cold war with the Soviet Union. As a result, a strong military had become imperative. Many ammunition manufacturing corporations sprung up in the United States to meet this demand. The only way such a large industrial base could survive is by creating more demands for ammunition, combat vehicles, etc. The military industry in America is so big that they can sway and influence the decisions taken in the executive branch of government. In effect, since the conclusion of the Second World War, the United States had seen a virtual “war economy”. Such an economic system can only thrive in an atmosphere of international tension and hostility, which is a bad result for humanity at large. Eisenhower was a shrewd statesman and an admirable leader (in the capacities of a General and a President). He understood this nexus between the weapons manufacturers and its employers in the American military. Eisenhower understood the vicious nature of this symbiotic relationship between a government agency and a commercial enterprise and warned his citizens to be wary of its consequences. In other words, he cautioned his fellow countrymen to mobilize themselves in curbing this negative development in post war America. Looking back at the recent history of American military intervention across the globe, one cannot stop wondering if those were the manifestations of Eisenhower’s nightmares. Furthermore, the general dissent and disapproval that the United States attracts in the third world countries is another indication of the military-industrial complex’s existence. What’s ironic about this message from Eisenhower is the fact that he himself was part and parcel of this military-industrial nexus. During the early months of 1962, hordes of demonstrators took to the streets in protest against the social and economic policies of the Guatemalan government headed by General Miguel Ydigoras Fuentes. The protesters were also disappointed with the level of corruption and election malpractices under the leadership of General Fuentes. Students and people from the working classes joined this protest, which was gaining momentum. Police and military forces eventually broke this democratic and peaceful form of public expression, but not before a series of hostile confrontations and a general strike had taken place. The American government, caught up in the cold-war frenzy, found a case for interfering with the internal governance of Guatemala. The American government, under the leadership of Dwight Eisenhower, saw this as a communist threat. Guatemala, being so close to the North American continent was touted as a “serious threat” for the “democratic and capitalistic ideals” of the United States. So, what followed was an influx of American support for the deposed General Fuentes and against the egalitarian revolutionary forces. And President Eisenhower was instrumental in the United States’ involvement in Guatemala. But unfortunately, things did not go in favour of the American mission. What followed was a relentless hostile engagement between the revolutionary and the counter-revolutionary forces (the latter supported by the Eisenhower government). By the end of 1976, as many as 20,000 innocent Guatemalans lost their lives in the process. And the whole episode ended as a public relations disaster for the United States. The ramifications of that dark episode have made Latin American countries suspicious and sceptical of the American government policies, even to this day. The volatile situation escalated into a war a few years later. In the month of June, 1967, the Sinai Peninsula, Golan Heights, Gaza Strip, East Jerusalem and the West Bank were invaded by Israel. This set-off the six day war. The defences of the Arab countries were less advanced compared to the state-of-the-art Israeli artillery and transport. So, the Arab States were thoroughly defeated within the span of six days. With it, the geopolitical stakes of the United States in the Middle East changed. Events, of late, had profoundly changed the nature of the Israeli-American partnership. Previously, American support in Arab-Israeli conflicts was Israel’s primary interest. For America, it was the advantage it could gain in its global cold war with U.S.S.R. was the chief motive. Israeli culture and political setup resonated with that of the United States’. So, all these made Israel a desirable ally, the collapse of the U.S.S.R. had changed the equations drastically and the United States no longer has the same incentive to stick its neck out for its friend. In this new scenario, the United States should consider the issue of Palestinian statehood independently of other parties and should implement it roadmap to peace initiative with the interests of the Palestinians in mind. The solutions are to be found in UN Resolutions 194 and 242. In the long run, a peaceful and stable Middle East would serve America more than anyone else, especially in the contemporary world where Islamic fundamentalism and international terrorism are on the rise. (Fernandez) Viewed in this light, the economic imperialism of the present day is a sophisticated form of militaristic imperialism of yester-centuries; United States being at the forefront of this wave. It was not simply a matter of plundering wealth, but of preserving long-standing systemic conditions for retaining power and privilege within the neo-imperialist society. In the American context (the only remaining superpower), almost all Presidents, including McKinley, Theodore Roosevelt, William Howard Taft, Warren G. Harding and Calvin Coolidge were party to this phenomenon. Though masked in the rhetoric of aversion to old-fashioned imperialism and its hopes for world peace, the centrepiece of its strategy remains economic expansionism. And, to execute that strategy the imperialist government will do all it can in "pushing and holding open doors in all parts of the world with all the engines of government ranging from polite coercion to the use of arms” The 1973 War between Israel and the Arab nations of Egypt and Syria is directly related to the Six-Day War that took place six years earlier. While the actual attrition is restricted to the middle-east region, the conflict has had broader implications for the then existing world order. Also known as the Yom Kippur War or Ramadan War, the reasons for the initiation of the war are not purely local. In other words, cold-war tension was palpable during the war as a result of the United States support of Israel and the U.S.S.R.’s support of its rivals. Richard Nixon (the President) and Henry Kissinger (a senior member of the Nixon Administration) have had significant roles to play in the manner in which the war eventually played out. Both Nixon and Kissinger dealt with the situation in a cautious and diplomatic manner. The Middle-east region offered economic advantages to its trading partners due to the abundant energy resources available in its terrain. More importantly, it is of strategic importance to both the super-powers, as maintaining dominance over the world order is not possible without controlling the region. By the end of the military conflict the cold-war power alignments had been altered. Egypt’s pre-war leaning toward the Soviet Union had weakened as a result of the war. The war also brought to light Syria’s support for Arabs. By the end of the war, popular cynicism of the Israel government reached its peak both domestically and internationally, leading to the resignation of top leaders. On a more positive note, it had become the United States’ responsibility to ensure peace in the region; as a result of its increased dependency of resources in the Middle-east. The Nixon Doctrine was presented to the American public on 25th July, 1969 by the then President Richard Nixon. The doctrine had two important components to it – one pertaining to relationship with allies and the other regarding achieving world peace. Nixon stated in his address to the nation that the traditional allies of the United States should defend themselves without the latter’s military involvement. He also set an agenda for achieving world peace through a process of diplomacy. Later in the year Nixon’s explicated his doctrine thus: “First, the United States will keep all of its treaty commitments. Second, we shall provide a shield if a nuclear power threatens the freedom of a nation allied with us or of a nation whose survival we consider vital to our security. Third, in cases involving other types of aggression, we shall furnish military and economic assistance when requested in accordance with our treaty commitments. But we shall look to the nation directly threatened to assume the primary responsibility of providing the manpower for its defence.” This three point doctrine first saw its implementation during the crisis in Iran. Saudi Arabia, a long time ally of the U.S. benefited as a result of this change in American foreign policy. In the final analysis, the doctrine met with only partial success owing to the fact that American military and diplomatic assistance across the world (particularly in the middle-east) proved to aggravate the crisis in some cases. Many believe Ronald Reagan alone didn’t win the Cold War but will say that his policy of peace through strength was most critical in addition to his superb leadership. The Soviet Union collapsed of its own weight, but Reagan’s initiatives accelerated their fall. Reagan described the Soviet Union as an evil empire. With the scare of the Soviets nuclear weapons, Reagan developed the “Star Wars” program which forced the Soviets into an expensive arms race they couldn’t afford. During Ronald Reagan’s eight year presidency, his determination to put an end to communism and the Soviet Union was the highlight of his term in office. While the collapse of the Soviet Union was inevitable, the role of Ronald Reagan in acceleration its fall is not insignificant. The rest of the essay will foray into the prevailing political circumstances and crucial diplomatic events that were initiated by the Reagan Administration, which eventually precipitated the collapse of the Soviet Union and put an end to the Cold War. To begin with, a short overview of the cold war is quite relevant here. History will show that the European nations after Second World War were divided geographically as well as ideologically as belonging to the western democratic bloc or the eastern communist bloc. Long-time partner and a trusted lieutenant of the United States, namely Great Britain, is the leading representative of this western coalition. Other nations that aligned with the United States were Netherlands, France, Spain, Italy, Belgium, etc. The countries of Eastern Europe were imposed with communist governments and hence came under the influence of the Soviet Union. Some of them were Poland, Czechoslovakia, Belarus, etc. Germany was deemed a key prize in the spoils of the Second Great War and so its reigns were bitterly contested. In the end both superpowers had to strike a compromise and divide Germany into their respective halves. This event was a key flashpoint in the years immediately following the end of the War. Appropriate to the strategic significance of Germany, history will mark the breaking of the Berlin wall as a landmark event in the establishment of a new world order, with the United States at the helm. And Ronald Reagan’s political manoeuvring in the days leading up to the breaking of Berlin Wall will be deemed by historians as legendary. In Michael Gorbachev, the Soviet Union had a reformist and practical leader. He saw the folly of continuing the cold war efforts and drafted policies facilitating a transfer to more democratic and capitalistic forms of government. Reagan’s agenda for his meeting with Gorbachev is related to his vision of a nuclear defence mechanism. In other words, “Reagan's vision of SDI—a shield that would render nuclear weapons obsolete—was scientifically preposterous but, by all accounts, genuine. Many of his hawkish aides (most notably the still-active Richard Perle) scoffed at it; they liked SDI because it would scare the Russians and, if it worked, might give us nuclear superiority. But Reagan believed what he said”. At their one-on-one meeting of October 1986, Reagan went far beyond his Russian counterpart’s proposal of a fifty percent “strategic-arms cut”. To the concern of some members of his administration, who were excluded from the decision making process, he proposed a nuclear deterrent program and supplement it with the implementation of the SDI. Though Gorbachev was at apprehensive about such an agreement, this proposal helped lift the image of Reagan within the Kremlin and he came to be seen as someone trustworthy. Hence, though Reagan’s role is not tangible, certain subtle diplomatic victories by his administration had helped a great deal in bringing an end to the Cold War. References: Chomsky, Noam, What Uncle Sam Really Wants, First published in 1993 Gaddis, J.L., The Cold War: a new history, 2005, retrieved from www.foreignaffairs.org Nye, J.S., US Power and Strategy After Iraq, Foreign Affairs, 2003. Anderson, R D (Spring 2005)., Lessons from history on the limits of imperialism: Successful small state resistance to great power aggression., Journal of Third World Studies, 22, 1. p.21(20). Ambrose, Rise to Globalism: American foreign Policy since 1938, 6th Edition Hestedt, American foreign Policy: Past, Present, Future. Brewer, American foreign policy: a Contemporary Introduction. Ambrose, Rise to Globalism: American foreign Policy since 1938, 6th Edition But, the Arab population of the State of Israel declined by almost 40 per cent as a result of partition and the armistice agreements. The Arab exodus further reduced the Arab population by approximately 80 per cent. In sum, the Arab population following partition and the Arab exodus declined from a majority of 2:1, to a minority of only 12.5 per cent of the total population of the new state. Chomsky, Noam, What Uncle Sam Really Wants, First published in 1993 Chomsky, Noam, What Uncle Sam Really Wants, First published in 1993 Brewer, American foreign policy: a Contemporary Introduction. Anderson, R D (Spring 2005)., Lessons from history on the limits of imperialism: Successful small state resistance to great power aggression., Journal of Third World Studies, 22, 1. p.21(20). Anderson, R D (Spring 2005)., Lessons from history on the limits of imperialism: Successful small state resistance to great power aggression., Journal of Third World Studies, 22, 1. p.21(20). Anderson, R D (Spring 2005)., Lessons from history on the limits of imperialism: Successful small state resistance to great power aggression., Journal of Third World Studies, 22, 1. p.21(20). Chomsky, Noam, What Uncle Sam Really Wants, First published in 1993. Gaddis, J.L., The Cold War: a new history, 2005, retrieved from www.foreignaffairs.org Nye, J.S., US Power and Strategy After Iraq, Foreign Affairs, 2003. Hestedt, American foreign Policy: Past, Present, Future.

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