At their one-on-one meeting of October 1986, Reagan went far beyond his Russian counterpart’s proposal of a fifty percent “strategic-arms cut”. To the concern of some members of his administration, who were excluded from the decision making process, he proposed a nuclear deterrent program and supplement it with the implementation of the SDI. Though Gorbachev was at apprehensive about such an agreement, this proposal helped lift the image of Reagan within the Kremlin and he came to be seen as someone trustworthy. Hence, though Reagan’s role is not tangible, certain subtle diplomatic victories by his administration had helped a great deal in bringing an end to the Cold War[11].
References:
Chomsky, Noam, What Uncle Sam Really Wants, First published in 1993
Gaddis, J.L., The Cold War: a new history, 2005, retrieved from www.foreignaffairs.org Nye, J.S., US Power and Strategy After Iraq, Foreign Affairs, 2003.
Anderson, R D (Spring 2005)., Lessons from history on the limits of imperialism: Successful small state resistance to great power aggression., Journal of Third World Studies, 22, 1. p.21(20).
Ambrose, Rise to Globalism: American foreign Policy since 1938, 6th Edition
Hestedt, American foreign Policy: Past, Present, Future.
Brewer, American foreign policy: a Contemporary Introduction.
[1] Ambrose, Rise to Globalism: American foreign Policy since 1938, 6th Edition
[2] But, the Arab population of the State of Israel declined by almost 40 per cent as a result of partition and the armistice agreements. The Arab exodus further reduced the Arab population by approximately 80 per cent. In sum, the Arab population following partition and the Arab exodus declined from a majority of 2:1, to a minority of only 12.5 per cent of the total population of the new state.
[3] Chomsky, Noam, What Uncle Sam Really Wants, First published in 1993