Terrorism: Dossier & Intelligence Report

In this Terrorism dossier and intelligence report, the origins, history and operations of two terrorist organizations – Al Qaeda and Jemaah Islamiah – are discussed. From a study of the rationale and motive of these two groups, we can arrive at the security implications for the Australian government and the preventative measures that could be taken to thwart any possible terrorist attacks. Group Names and their interpretation: Firstly, the term ‘terrorist organization’ should not be interpreted to mean a formal hierarchy of personnel who are assigned fixed responsibilities and duties. On the other hand they imply propaganda and support mechanism whose aim is to recruit willing individuals from the Islamic world to participate in the holy war, also known as ‘Jihad’. Consistent with this fact, the term ‘Al Qaeda’ was not Christened by Osama bin Laden; rather, it was the United States intelligence agency CIA that referred to the Islamic activists led by bin Laden in this manner in the mid-1990s. Al Qaeda, translated from Arabic, literally means a “foundation or precept’. The term Jemaah Islamiyah is translatable into “Islamic community” (Utley, 2004, p.34). Hence, the employment of terrorism is not an intrinsic aspect of these organizations. Terrorism is only a tactic that was adopted during the last decade or so, but there is nothing inevitable about it. This fact should be kept in mind by Australian security agencies, while drawing awareness campaigns and security measures, for far too often western intelligence tends to portray these Islamic groups to indulge in terrorist activities for terror’s sake. This is not true. The Jihadists’ objective is to defend their faith and their way of life, which they feel is threatened by the western cultural and military interventions in the Islamic world (and there is sufficient proof to support this assertion). It is prudent on part of the Australian government to address the grievances held by the world-wide Islamic community and attempt to remedy it, instead of imposing more internal restrictions or external interventions, for the latter approach does not address the root cause as the former does. To quote, “Radical Islam will continue to grow if Muslims, despite being the world's second largest religious community, continue to be treated like pariahs of the international community. Never in recent history have Muslims been subjected to such intense scrutiny, marginalization, and siege on a global scale. This state of utter bewilderment, disorientation, panic, and rage has the potential to intensify in the future, even in Southeast Asia, a region long known for peace and prosperity” (Utley, 2004, p.34). Leadership: Both Al Qaeda and Jemaah Islamiya are founded on universal Islamic precepts of jihad and brotherhood. Hence, the role of their leaders is secondary to their message. For instance, even when Al Qaeda’s leader in Iraq Abu Musab al-Zarqawi was assassinated, there was no cessation in the local insurgency. Similarly, there is no conclusive evidence that Osama bin Laden is alive, yet the numbers of terror attacks targeted at western interests have seen an unprecedented rise since the events of September 11. Also, the Southeast Asian region is populated by numerous militant Islamist outfits, whose ideologies are nearly the same. The threat posed to Australian interests in Southeast Asia comes from small and marginalized groups who are spread all across the region. Alongside Jemaah Islamiah (JI) in Malaysia, Singapore, and Indonesia; “we have the Kumpulan Mujahidin Malaysia; and al-Maunah in Malaysia; the Abu Sayaff in the southern Philippines; Pattani United Liberation Organization in southern Thailand; and Laskar Jihad, Majlis Mujahideen, and Islamic Defenders' Front in Indonesia.” Hence the security measures taken by the Australian government should not confine itself to a particular militant entity, but should focus on the broader phenomenon of global Jihad (Chehab, 2006, p.37). History: The present wave of Islamic revivalism and the rise of Islamic fundamentalism across the world originated during the 1970s. The movement started as a reaction to the disillusionment and failure associated with modern neo-liberal economic policies. The first world has had longstanding association with Muslim-dominant nations that are oppressive, authoritarian and dictatorial. A prime example of this would be Saudi Arabia, with whom the United States and its allies (including Australia) don’t seem to have a problem, in spite of copious evidence of severe human rights violations within its borders (Smith, 2002, p.34). This apparent hypocrisy of the west had induced a sense of discontent and anger within the wider Islamic community. That is when influential Muslim thinkers such as like Hassan al-Banna and Sayyid Qutb involved themselves in social activism, which later spawned militant outfits like the Al Qaeda and Jemaah Islamiah. This point is illustrated succinctly in the following passage: “Islamic radicalism in Southeast Asia is not a sudden and recent phenomenon. In reality, it has been in the making for more than 20 years; its roots originate in events in the Middle East, the effects of which have reverberated worldwide. This in turn was facilitated by the impact of globalization and technological advancement. However, the catalytic role played by Al-Qaeda, especially since the early 1990s, is perhaps the single most significant factor in the global terrorist threat confronting the world today.” (Desker, 2003, p.491) Rationale: The seeds for Islamic militancy against western targets were sown by three major events of western intervention in Islamic affairs. The first and the seemingly perennial of the three is the Israel-Palestine conflict. Ever since the installation of Israel in 1948, a status of second-class citizenship was imposed on the native Arab Muslims in the region. American interference in Iran, where it deposed democratically elected government and handed over the reigns to the Shah. The subsequent dilution in Islamic values in Iran as a result of Shah’s inclination toward modernity and his apathy toward declining economic conditions had enraged Iranians, a radical section of who have pledged participation in Jihad. And thirdly, when the United States and the erstwhile Soviet Union played out their Cold war conflict in Afghanistan, its people felt “used and exploited” by the hegemonic western powers (Charle, 2003, p.19). These blatant political indiscretions on part of the First World and the more subtle cultural imperialism in the form of capitalism and material consumerism have provided sound rationale for organizations such as Al Qaeda and Jemaah Islamiah to fight for their right to self-determination. Any action on part of the Australian government to tighten security should be historically informed. Otherwise, the primary causes for Islamic militancy will continue to provide more emotional and intellectual fodder for violent responses (Charle, 2003, p.19). Activities: The most brutal act of terrorism to date on western interests has been the September 11, 2001 attacks on the World Trade Centre and Pentagon. Nearly 3000 innocent civilians perished in this event. Following this, there were bombings in London subway and Madrid. While the casualties on these later attacks did not run into the thousands, they nevertheless increased the fear and threat of terrorism in the First World. The closest act of terrorism near Australian soil was the Bali bombing of October 2002. This was the Jihadists’ way of warning Australia and deterring it in collaborating with the United States. But unfortunately, the message was ignored by the Australian government, putting its citizens at ever greater risk. Bali might not be officially Australian soil, but with the organization and skill with which the Islamic militants operate, it might not be long before Australia is made to pay for its ill advised alliance with imperialists further north (Ronczkowski, 2004, p.102). Strengths: The key to the success of outfits such as Jemaah Islamiah and Al Qaeda is their common precept. These organizations are not defined by distinguishable from one another, for they all claim to fight for Islam in their respective regions. The following passage explains how Osama bin Laden was able to bring together people of different ethnic and national identity under his leadership: “The potency of Al-Qaeda rests in its ability to channel the Islamic forces it inspires. More than any other leader before him, Osama bin Laden has been able to unify radical Islam and to focus its rage. However, Osama's success must be seen in the context of two parallel historical developments--namely, the polarization of Islamic extremist forces coinciding with a broader current of increasing religious orthodoxy and the politicization of the ‘ummah’ (Islamic community) throughout the world. These phenomena have been going on for more than the last 20 years.” (Burke, 2004, p.19) Location/Area of Operation: A powerful leader such as bin Laden was able to successfully franchise Islamic Jihad to a broad range of local Muslims, each with their own unique history of suffering and grievances. Hence, there is an aspect of fluidity in the locations/regions in which various units operate. Jemaah Islamiah was initially founded in Singapore, but now has spread its tentacles to other parts of South East Asia. It now poses the greatest threat to Australian interests. But even Jemaah Islamiah was inspired by Osama bin Laden and in that sense all these terrorist groups with different labels are essentially the same for all practical purposes. In other words, the common mandate provided by Osama bin Laden--a broad based jihad against the enemies of Islam--facilitates these outfits to persevere with their domestic struggles, but is contained within the broader global cause, namely, the defence of Islam. In Southeast Asia, some important groups that came under the influence of Al-Qaeda, include “the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG), the KMM, and Jemaah Islamiah” (Bleiker, 2003, p.430). Financial sources: According to Malaysian intelligence sources, Jemaah Islamiah’s leader Hambali, who also has links to Al Qaeda has close to half a million US dollars for carrying out his operations. In Islamic society, social cohesion is high and class differences are mitigated by universal brotherhood. Hence, there is an array of sources from which these Islamist organizations gather their funds. These are: * Cash brought into the country by individuals * Funds skimmed from Islamic charities * Corporate entities (some very overt, others are self-sustaining fronts for terrorist activities) * Proceeds from hawala shops and gold sales * Contributions (zakat and infaq) from its own members * Contributions (infaq) from outsiders * Al Qaeda investments and accounts already established in the region, especially in the region's Islamic banks, and * Petty crime, racketeering, extortion, gun-running and kidnapping (Zachary, 2003, p.174). Evaluation of Risk to Australian Interests: It is obvious from the array of facts presented above that the best way forward for policy makers in Canberra is to sever strategic alliance with the United States and focus its energies on mending ties with its South East Asian neighbours. The South East Asia region has a large Muslim population. Indonesia is a thriving centre for Islamic scholarship and practice. But unfortunately, Australia had sided with the oppressive Suharto regime and had tacitly aided injustice. The Muslims in the region have every reason to feel aggrieved; what Australia needs to keep its intelligence gathering efforts to a minimum and focus its energies on reaching out to its neighbours. Travel warnings and terror alerts cannot be more than superficial attempts to protect Australian citizens. A real change in the threat of terror will only come about when economic opportunism and imperialist ambition is replaced with humanitarian concern and noble statesmanship. The Australian indifference to Muslim causes goes back many decades, but the tensions have escalated post September 11, 2001: “Southeast Asia--home to more than 250 million Muslims and to the largest Islamic country in the world (Indonesia) --has experienced a perceptible intensification of Islamic militancy after September 11, 2001. The futility of the US-led war in Iraq and the failure of the "coalition of the willing" (that includes Australia) to secure UN approval to attack Iraq have heightened Islamic animosity in the region and across the Muslim world” (Bellamy, 2004, p.155). Hence, Australia must rethink its responsibility toward its neighbours. Attempts at providing its citizens with travel warnings and probability of terror attacks are short sighted and ineffective in bringing peace and harmony to the region in particular and the world in general. Bibliography Abuza, Zachary., "Funding Terrorism in Southeast Asia: The Financial Network of Al Qaeda and Jemaah Islamiya." Contemporary Southeast Asia 25, no. 2 (2003): 169+. Abuza, Zachary. "Tentacles of Terror: Al Qaeda's Southeast Asian Network." Contemporary Southeast Asia 24, no. 3 (2002): 427+. Bellamy, Alex J. "Terrorism, Freedom and Security: Winning without War." The Australian Journal of Politics and History 50, no. 1 (2004): 153+. Bleiker, Roland., "Aestheticising Terrorism: Alternative Approaches to 11 September." The Australian Journal of Politics and History 49, no. 3 (2003): 430+. Brimley, Shawn. "Tentacles of Jihad: Targeting Transnational Support Networks." Parameters 36, no. 2 (2006): 30+. Burke, Jason. "Al Qaeda: The Mere Mention of Al Qaeda Conjures Images of an Efficient Terrorist Network Guided by a Powerful Criminal Mastermind. Yet Al Qaeda Is More Lethal as an Ideology Than as an Organization. "Al Qaedaism" Will Continue to Attract Supporters in the Years to Come-Whether Osama Bin Laden Is around to Lead Them or Not." Foreign Policy, May/June 2004, 18+. Chalk, Peter., "The Response to Terrorism as a Threat to Liberal Democracy." The Australian Journal of Politics and History 44, no. 3 (1998): 373. Chalk, Peter,, and William Rosenau. Confronting "The Enemy Within": Security Intelligence, the Police, and Counterterrorism in Four Democracies., Santa Monica, CA: Rand, 2004. Charle, Suzanne., "Losing Friends in Indonesia: Even Moderates Who Have Denounced Terrorism Fear Being Seen as U.S. Puppets.", The Nation, December 29, 2003, 19. Chehab, Zaki. "Al-Qaeda: Still a Step Ahead; Why the Organisational Skills of Osama Bin Laden and His Deputy Ayman Al-Zawahiri Continue to Outwit the West.", New Statesman, July 3, 2006, 37. Desker, Barry. "The Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) Phenomenon in Singapore.", Contemporary Southeast Asia 25, no. 3 (2003): 489+. Mutalib, Hussin. "Misunderstood: Political Islam in Southeast Asia.", Harvard International Review 28, no. 2 (2006): 84+. Reinares, Fernando., "Democratic Regimes, Internal Security Policy and the Threat of Terrorism." The Australian Journal of Politics and History 44, no. 3 (1998): 351. Ronczkowski, Michael R. Terrorism and Organized Hate Crime: Intelligence Gathering, Analysis, and Investigations. Boca Raton, FL: CRC Press, 2004. Smith, Paul J. "Transnational Terrorism and the Al Qaeda Model: Confronting New Realities." Parameters 32, no. 2 (2002): 33+. Utley, Jon Basil. "Analyzing Al Qaeda and Protecting America.", World and I, May 2004, 34.

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