Actual GDP growth Population growth
1996-2000 2001-2005 1996-2000 2001-2005
Euro Area 2.7 1.4 0.3 0.6
(Germany) (2.0) (0.6) (0.1) (0.1)
(France) (2.8) (1.5) (0.4) (0.6)
(Italy) (1.9) (0.6) (0.0) (0.6)
Rest of EU15 3.2 2.3 0.3 0.4
(UK) (3.2) (2.4) (0.3) (0.4)
EU15 2.8 1.6 0.3 0.5
EU10 4.3 3.8 -0.2 -0.1
EU25 2.9 1.7 0.2 0.4
US 4.1 2.4 1.2 1.0 (Green, 2001)
GDP per capita1 growth
1996-2000 2001-2005
Euro Area 2.5 0.8
(Germany) (1.9) (0.6)
(France) (2.4) (0.8)
(Italy) (1.9) (0.1)
Rest of EU15 2.9 1.9
(UK) (2.9) (2.0)
EU15 2.5 1.0
EU10 4.5 3.9
EU25 2.7 1.2
US 2.9 1.4
(Source: DG ECFIN's macroeconomic database AMECO.)
A scientific approach to measuring the pros and cons of post-unification German success makes for an interesting discussion. This approach, first conceived under the leadership of Helmut Kohl saw wider application following the rise to power of the Green coalition toward the end of the century. Consequently, Gerhard Schroder released an array of ambitious programme proposals. He proclaimed that under his leadership, “Germany standing up for its national interests will be just as natural as France or Britain standing up for theirs” (Anderson, 1999). Germany’s contribution toward the European Union budget was consistent with such a theme. The meant that Germany needed to do much more to secure its vested interests against its extravagant and expedient partners. This was reflected in many of the policies of the Schroder government. The following are some key diplomatic efforts of this new policy framework:
1. The failed attempt during the German EU Presidency in the early months of 1999 to bring down the German contribution to the EU budget negotiations by inducing other member nations to contribute more.
2. The diplomatic manoeuvres made for the appointment of Gunther Verheugen as the Commissioner of the European Union for enlargement questions, that is, in an area of direct, strategic interest to Germany.
3. The determined attempts of German federal ministries, and private corporate interests to “defend their possessions in the enlargement negotiations on such issues as border controls, environmental standards, social dumping, transitional structural aid, and the flee movement of labour” (Paterson, 2003).
4. Protectionism and the role of Schroder in preventing the implementation of a common European Union decree on the recycling of automobiles.