The Battle of Midway remains one of the pivotal events of World War II, precipitating the beginning of the end of Japanese ascendancy in the Asia Pacific region. The military confrontation between the United States of America and the Japanese Empire escalated in the early months of 1942, as strategic territories located in and around the Pacific Ocean saw unprecedented levels of attritional warfare. The following passages will analyze the unfolding of events during the Battle of Midway from various authors’ viewpoints and place this battle in the wider context of the Second World War and the then emergent new world order.
To begin with, let us consider the book written by Jonathan Parshall and Anthony Tully titled Shattered Sword: The Untold Story of the Battle of Midway. The most remarkable aspect of this book is the fact that the authors try to present the political and military developments from the point of view of the Japanese. American and British documentations of the Battle of Midway can at times be biased in favor of the Allied forces. So, this change in perspective offered by Parshall and Tully comes across as refreshing and different. This is not to say that their account of the story lacks objectivity and balance. We learn that Admiral Yamamoto’s planned to keep Japanese forces in the Midway and western Aleutian Islands as a way of gaining advantage over the Naval Fleet of the United States . In contrast with the commonly available literature on the Japanese plan, Parshall and Tully explicate in detail its technological, doctrinal and historical aspects spanning the early decades of the twentieth century. The authors also allude to the contrasting motives and modus operandi of the Japanese and American air strategies. The following passage from the book illustrates the range of references and attention to detail exhibited by the authors:
“The Akagi, Kaga, Soryu, and Hiryu, the four aircraft carriers of “Kido Butai,” the First Mobile Striking Force formed the offensive core of Japan’s fleet. Commanded by Admiral Nagumo, “Kido Butai” planned to attack Midway and then destroy any elements of the U.S. Pacific Fleet that tried to intervene. The Pacific Fleet commander, Admiral Nimitz, surprised the Japanese as a result of the earlier breaking of Japanese naval codes. By dusk of June 4 all four Japanese aircraft carriers had been sunk or abandoned” .
The account of the Battle of Midway, provided by the distinguished historian David M. Kennedy, presents a slightly different picture. The author explains how magnitude of damage incurred by the American Pacific Fleet during the Pearl Harbor bombings failed to alter the ultimate result on the Japanese front. In the period between the First and Second World Wars, the nature of artillery and their strategic importance had changed significantly. While Naval Fleets were a crucial part of imperial warfare in the preceding decades and centuries, it would be the flying bomber aircrafts that would assume the role of military spearhead. David Kennedy cites this as the reason why the sweeping devastation at Pearl Harbor did not diminish American strategic advantage over the Japanese. Interestingly, none of the American airplane carrier ships were docked at Pearl Harbor on December 7 1941, which is to prove a decisive stroke of good fortune for the Allies. As the author explains, “the Yorktown had been detached in April for duty in the Atlantic. The Saratoga was stateside for repairs. The Enterprise and the Lexington were at sea near Wake and Midway Islands respectively. Fuchida’s raiders had also failed to damage Pearl Harbor’s repair shops” .
More important however, the strikes did not damage the large fuel-oil tank farm. Any dent to this source of fuel, which had been transported all the way from the North American continent, would almost inevitably have compelled the American Navy to retreat back to its bases on the West Coast. Such an eventuality would have dealt a massive blow to American plans of countering Japanese aggression in the Pacific and may have had an effect on the war that was raging in the Eurasian landmass. Hence, while admittedly presenting the story from the Allied powers’ point of view, David Kennedy gives cogent factual examples and incisive logic in support of his arguments.
The decisive factor in the battle in Pacific was not due to any intimidating military posturing or shrewd strategic maneuver from either side. In contrast, it was the technological superiority of American cryptanalysts in deciphering the Japanese communications that would prove the difference between the two sides. To elaborate, even as the Japanese Imperial Navy, under the leadership of Yamamoto and Nagumo was readying a fleet of two hundred ships around the Midway Islands, the American radio signal decoders were able to successfully deconstruct the copious volumes of Japanese transcripts that were pouring in. This gave the American leadership an advanced notice of the Japanese plan of attack, which it perused in devising suitable counter measures. This undertaking of critical importance came to be known as project “Magic” and its success would hand the United States of America victory in the Battle of Midway. Not only does author Arthur Winn demonstrate technical knowledge, but also makes references to particular individuals involved in the project “Magic” . By way of portraying their expertise and eccentricities, and by placing their endeavor in the context of the war, the author adds a human touch to the somber enterprise of documenting history. These qualities are manifest in the following passage from the text:
“Working without sleep amid spine-cracking tension in a windowless basement room at Pearl Harbor, Commander Joseph J. Rochefort, the chief of the Combat Intelligence Unit colloquially known as “Station Hypo,” pored over the maddeningly fragmentary intercepts piled atop his makeshift worktable of planks and sawhorses. Rochefort had adapted to this mole like existence by working in slippers and a red smoking jacket. In the spit-and-polish Navy, he and his equally unkempt colleagues were regarded as eccentric. But their knowledge of the Japanese language, in a Navy that had only about forty competent Japanese-speakers, was indispensable, as was their mastery of the arcana of cryptanalysis-the sorcerer’s art of deciphering the enemy’s most carefully guarded communications codes” .
With the American team breaking into the Japanese coded messages, this was to prove decisive in the end, as the Japanese navy confronted its worst nightmare. Nagumo’s frequent changes to the plan, as well as his lack of conviction to act expeditiously at crucial moments have contributed to the downfall of the Japanese. Once the codes are broken into, the Japanese position was weakened. According to author Stephen Gorman,
“American aircrafts flew desperate sorties from airfields on Midway and from three aircraft carriers, the Yorktown, Enterprise, and Hornet. Uncertain if they even had enough fuel to return to base, American fliers nonetheless crippled the Japanese fleet, sending four carriers, a heavy cruiser, 253 planes, and 3,500 pilots and sailors to the bottom. The Battle of Midway was Japan’s last offensive, marking the turning point of the war in the Pacific” .
In conclusion, it can be stated that the authors discussed in this essay have shown different styles of scholarship, giving prominence to various aspects of the Battle of Midway. Any student of World War II history, especially those studying the theatre of war in the Pacific, will have to peruse these resources in order to gain a well-rounded understanding of the event. With wide ranging bibliographic references, relevant appendices and footnotes, these authors have adhered to high standards of academic writing. These works further goes on to show how much can still be learned about the Second World War even after 60 years of research and scholarship on the subject.
WORKS CITED
Gorman, Stephen. 1998. Reawakening Midway. World and I, September, 130+.
Jonathan Parshall and Anthony Tully. Dulles, Shattered Sword: The Untold Story of the Battle of Midway, Va.: Potomac Books, 2005. Pp. 613.
Kennedy, David M. 1999. Victory at Sea. The Atlantic Monthly, March, 51.
Winn, Arthur C. 2001. Codebreaking in World War II. Parameters 31, no. 4: 149+.
Weinberg, Gerhard L. World in the Balance: Behind the Scenes of World War II. London: Trustees Brandeis University, 1981.
Spector, Ronald H. Eagle Against The Sun: The American War With Japan. New York: Vintage Books, 1985.