It is a well documented fact that oil spills can create lasting damage to the oceans, sometimes leading to irrecoverable losses to marine ecosystems and inhabiting species. In the Exxon Valdez spill that took place two decades back, 258,000 barrels of oil were spilled into Alaska’s Prince William Sound. Although only a fifth of the total supertanker got spilled, its impact was devastating. In light of this and similar events, governments across the world have created legislations and regulations to mitigate risk. One such crucial legislation in the wake of the Exxon Valdez disaster was the U.S. Oil Pollution Act of 1990 (OPA ’90), which imposed unlimited liability on proprietors and operators of ships and shore facilities who discharge oil into surrounding waters. This Act met with much criticism, especially from energy company lobbyists, for it contained strict rules and regulations that had the potential to alter international oil trade. For example, the cost of compliance with OPA ’90 was said to be “$1.3 billion over the next 24 years, but some say the figure will be closer to $7 million by 2015.” (Oshins, 1992, p.54) This is an important statistic in the context of this essay, for it indicates the real reason behind continued instances of oil spills – namely, cost of compliance. Although the OPA ’90 was supposed to deter sub-standard safety measures, it has not fulfilled that end. This is in part due to the perceived excesses in some of its clauses. There is validity to those claims which portray OPA ’90 in negative light, attacking it for the severity of punitive measures it encompasses. For example, under the OPA ’90, “in addition to removal costs, the responsible party becomes liable for consequential damages: harm to natural resources, economic loss to real or personal property, losses suffered by one who earns subsistence from natural resources, losses in tax revenues, loss to profit or earning capacity, and increased expense of public services.” (Oshins, 1992, p.54)
Hence, a major drawback of the legislation is its underlying assumption that exorbitant financial compensation after the event will somewhat prompt oil companies to tighten up their transportation procedures. But this assumption has proven weak. For example, although there are some efforts by major oil companies toward making their oceanic oil transport as risk-free as possible, the frequency of spills has not reduced. The recent British Petroleum disaster is another example of the systemic failure of oil industry and government agencies. The recent BP disaster is as much a result of human failures as it is due to technical shortcomings and inadequate planning. Even as investigations were started and all pretense of earnestness were shown by politicians, the most important reason has been ignored – namely, that deep sea drilling is inherently risky and continued use of fossil fuels are already affecting marine ecosystems through climate change. Another factor that amplifies risk of oil-spill is the generation of hydrate gas. Under a depth of 1000 feet or more beneath the sea-level hydrate gases such as methane are found in a solid state, compressed into “molecular cages of ice”. (Allen, 2010, p.12) But if they happen to get destabilized due to a reduction in pressure or rise in temperature, the “gas-water compound can quickly expand 164 times in volume. If ignited, even ice-bound hydrates burn. This could potentially block the [blowout preventer] stack, kill lines and chokes, obstruct the movement of the drill string, and cause serious operational and safety concerns including blowouts” (Allen, 2010, p.12)
In the last thirty years, 165 blowouts were witnessed in U.S. marine zones and 500 worldwide. The Minerals Management Service (MMS), which is the chief government agency looking into the problem, has not taken adequate steps to mitigate this risk. Even in the BP case, the MMS was suspected of colluding with the business corporation:
“If BP cut the corners, MMS handed it a chainsaw. Capping a long- corrupted relationship with the oil and gas industry it is supposed to regulate, MMS signed off on continuing the well-capping operation after BP managed to produce successful results by dropping the pressure at which it was testing the blowout preventer from the usual 10,000 pounds per square to 6,500. Despite BPs rank by Public Citizen as having “the worst safety and environmental record of any oil company operating in America” (in a field rife with accident-prone corporations), MMS trusted the company to do the right thing.” (Allen, 2010, p.12)
Although the British Petroleum disaster is the most recent, older oil spills are more useful for the purposes of this essay, for more research and statistics pertaining to these events are available now. Take, say, the oil spill that occurred off the Malaysian Island of Langkawi in 1992 (The Nagasaki Spirit oil spill). The Strait of Malacca in Malaysia is the nerve centre for South East Asia/Asia Pacific regions. (Dow, 1999, p.74) Since it is the busiest shipping lane in the world, it poses the challenge of navigability, making oil tankers prone to collision or mishaps. But government authorities have put in place a comprehensive marine transportation safety plan. Contingency plans for oil-spills in the form of response plans are also put in place. Special attention is given to the route taken by tankers in transit from Middle East. Identifying the need for protecting coastal human inhabitants (especially fisher-folk), efforts has been made to alleviate hazard to this group in the event of an oil-spill. The small-scale fisher-folk who live along the coast-line, are one high-risk group, for they “depend on coastal and fishery resources that are at risk. Assessment of social risk, or vulnerability, is based heavily on understanding the source of the fishers’ exposure: their dependence on vulnerable resources. Any such assessment, though, pays little attention to factors that shape the coping capabilities in fishers’ communities and households, strategies that can influence the scale of losses.” (Dow, 1999, p.74)
Hence, one could see both successes and failures in the Malaysian government’s preparedness for oil-spill. In the area of covering all bases in protecting human population living in coastal areas, the plans were not well thought out. Coming back to the OPA ’90, the stringent provisions and punitive measures under the Act have shown promise. (Richman, 2010, p.2) The Kodiak Island Borough v. Exxon Corp. case, which is considered a landmark in American legal history, is a case in point. The Supreme Court in 1999 considered state and federal statutory law against the common law of admiralty to come to the conclusion that Alaska municipalities could continue a claim against Exxon “for the cost of services diverted from their citizens in order to participate in the environmental cleanup effort necessitated by the Exxon Valdez oil spill….Recent changes resulting from oil pollution legislation constitute a logical step in the evolution of admiralty jurisdiction and are appropriate for an age in which society is recognizing its fragility and the complexity of its dependence on the natural environment.” (Weller, 2002, p.71)
Hence, we see the OPA ’90 bearing fruit in giving the general public some sort of protection. The implementation of the OPA was not a straight-forward affair, though, for many of its provisions were in conflict with state, federal or admiralty jurisdictions. At the crux of the debate over environment protection laws such as this is a perceived injustice. The question is: Why should the environment and innocent human inhabitants share the consequences of a hazard created by profit-oriented private companies. Moreover, those who are at high-risk for getting affected by oil spills are those who are least related to the private enterprise. In light of this unfairness, the Supreme Court rightly observed that oil spills are a great cause of concern to all coastal city or township. Its effect on the estuaries and the marine life is also acknowledged. The Supreme Court went on to note that
“States are the entities in the best position to decide what measures need to be in place to minimize those risks. Federal statutes such as the Clean Water Act and the Clean Air Act take into account the fact that pollution does not recognize state boundaries by requiring states to take consider the effect of their industries on the states downstream and downwind. International pollution control agreements, such as those addressing the depletion of stratospheric ozone, recognize that pollution is a global problem, and through variances for developing countries, they acknowledge that pollution and industry are necessarily intertwined. Ultimately, the international community benefits from the prevention and control of pollution, so international commerce can and must bear the costs of prevention and cleanup. The constitutional framework that enabled courts and legislatures to work together to address the problem of oil spills in an age of oil dependence should be celebrated.” (Weller, 2002, p.71)
In this context, the real problem that is holding back risk-mitigation efforts is the links between business and government. In the American context, while Washington and industry are meant to hold joint responsibility for accidents such as BP, so far they have only exhibited their shared impotence in the way the clean-up operation was dealt with. BP’s economy with the truth in properly disclosing risks, and later its total incompetency in bringing the situation under control has meant that the company has breached its social contract. And the hostile reactions to free-markets in the aftermath of this disaster are understandable. The critics are all of the view that private companies can no longer be trusted with the job of environmental protection. Sadly, though, neither can the government. The central government was, in law, and in fact, the owner of the section of the Gulf where BP drilled for oil resources. But it leased out its ownership rights to the private entity BP, which had an unimpressive safety record. The central government also “issued permits for the drilling operation, and required the company to use the government’s own flawed models in preparing for spills. It then failed to keep a sharp eye on what BP and subcontractors Transocean and Halliburton were doing to its property.” (Richman, 2010, p.2) This is likely due to the fact that government agencies do not relate to the property that private entities do. Governments also tend to get very lenient toward digressions on part of private companies. In the case of the Minerals Management Service, which is part of the Interior Department, there is a clear conflict of interest: “It makes money off the drilling it permits and regulates. Thus it could benefit from decisions that are bad for the public”. (Richman, 2010, p.2)
This brings us back to the question of why the general public (across nationalities) should bear the brunt for the failures of private corporations. It should also be remembered that the best way to mitigate risk in this area is by creating awareness among people and policy-makers alike about the non-sustainability of fossil fuel usage. Awareness should be created about the impossibility of eradicating deep-water drilling accidents. For example,
“Sophisticated technology and a multiplicity of fail-safe devices have failed: They leak, they explode, they poison the environment and they kill people. But when technology-based industries like oil drilling and nuclear power are tainted by greed, conflicts of interest, inadequate regulation and short-term thinking, catastrophes are not accidents-they are predictable outcomes. If ever there was an argument for putting public welfare over corporate profits and for establishing science-based regulatory bodies free from conflicts of interest, oil drilling and nuclear power- with their unavoidable and planet-threatening risks- are it. But beyond safety is sanity: Government must not only regulate industry, but must mandate and subsidize sustainable, green energy. Whatever the price, it is cheap compared to the costs of the current path.” (Allen, 2010, p.12)
In order for people to see real improvements in safety standards, the current hybrid system (comprising the government and corporations) will have to be dismantled. The two plausible options are ‘full government management’ or ‘full market management’. But full government control looks pessimistic from the outset, for this is where the currents problems started. Under private ownership, efficiency will certainly improve and the profit-motive might improve safety indirectly. But eventually if the profit-imperative so dictates, corporations would not hesitate to pollute the waters under their charge. In other words, bolstering the quarterly reports would be given priority over protecting marine eco systems. Hence, private corporations cannot be trusted with this responsibility even.
In this scenario, only two viable options remain: the first is to incentives align economic activity with the public good and the other where this synchronization is absent. In the latter, “personnel risk no capital, faces no prospects of bankruptcy, and procures their revenue by force (taxation) after flattering members of special-interest-serving congressmen”. (Richman, 2010, p.2) In the former, “capital has to be raised from wary investors in a competitive environment, insurance is priced according to risk, products have to be sold to buyers who are free to say no, and full and strict liability haunts every decision, with bankruptcy always looming and no government bailout even implied? When you come down to it, the choice is really rather easy.” (Richman, 2010, p.2) Identifying this much is the easy part. The real challenge would be bringing about this change, whereby, the general public has a say in activities that have profound consequences for their health and wellbeing. Along with creating awareness, mobilizing people at the grassroots level (as the Niger Delta example shows) is very important. It is only social solidarity of this sort that can save our planet from approaching destruction.
References
Allen, T. J. (2010, July). Bp Bets the Planet-we Lose. In These Times, 34, 12+.
Dow, K. (1999). The Extraordinary and the Everyday in Explanations of Vulnerability to an Oil Spill. The Geographical Review, 89(1), 74.
Oshins, A. H. (1992, December). The Risk of Oil Spills. Risk Management, 39, 54.
Richman, S. (2010, September). What Does the Oil Spill Prove?. Freeman, 60, 2+.
Weller, K. (2002). Exploring the Values at Stake When Environmental Regulation Meets Admiralty. Defense Counsel Journal, 69(1), 71+.