The inevitable Europeanization of Germany has had discernable changes in the nature of political organization and legislative outcomes. To begin with, there is a notable change at a structural level. For instance, “the development of party structures designed to facilitate co-ordination of European and national MPs, or co-ordination of national and European policy position” had altered the model of law-making in the country (Bulmer, 2001). This is a reflection of a pattern seen across the European Union, where most political parties have formed a European committee or European representative to the prevailing party structure. But most of these changes have been minor ones, and the communication between the party units at the national and the continental level has been very poor. More profound institutional changes have also taken place in the aftermath of the unification. In particular, “Europeanization can contribute to the consolidation and centralisation of party leadership, the streamlining of party practice, and a widening gap between leaders and rank and file” (Bulmer, 2001).
Since the end of the Cold War and the subsequent unification of Germany, there has been persistent discussion, analysis and debate in the academic and media circles over the perceived differences, between the structural aspects of Germany’s political and economic institutions before and after the unification. In this context, the term ‘Bonn Republic’ is applied to represent “the ‘old’ Federal Republic of Germany’s (FRG) political system, with its emphasis on political stability, consensus politics, high welfare expenditure and a multilateral foreign and defence policy”. In sharp contrast, what is termed the new ‘Berlin Republic’, post October 1990, “is seen to refer to a more fluid polity, in which traditional patterns of domestic politics and policy are called into question, and whose foreign policy is ‘normalising’ in terms of pursuing clearly-defined national interests” (Tewes, 1998).
Though Germany is the leading endorser of the EU’s enlargement eastwards, it has found this concept incompatible with its objective to promote stronger European integration. By employing the “role theory”, an explanation could be found for this state of conflicting interests. More precisely,
“West Germany’s post-war role in European politics was that of a promoter of deeper integration; the deepening of West European integration thus became part of the self-conception of West German foreign policy-making elites. The changed situation after 1990 placed new demands on German foreign policy makers. West Germany’s traditional self-conception as an integration deepener conflicted with the desire on behalf of unified Germany to press for EU enlargement. However, although German policy makers employed a variety of strategies in order to pursue their incongruous foreign-policy aims, their principal concern remained with the deepening of western integration”. (Jeffery, 2003)
In addition to the issue of western integration, there is widespread debate within Germany about the changing nature of the country’s identity in light of its new policy framework. An area of concern for many German intellectuals is the implication of this new identity to the country’s decision making process and vice versa. This issue is very significant, as Germans are always cautious in matters affecting their identity and perception from outside. This goes back a long way, the most notable example of which is the so-called “Primat der Aussenpolitik, the doctrine of the primacy of foreign policy, that was adopted during the nineteenth century” (Lansbury and Pain, 1997).
Many European intellectuals, including Manfred Schmidt, William Paterson and Douglas Webber have pinpointed “the broad continuities that have persisted in post-unification Germany’s political economy, foreign policy and consensus-oriented policy-making respectively” (Green, 2008). Yet, post unification, Germany has undoubtedly witnessed some key changes. To take a prominent case, there is little doubt that Germany’s collective bargaining power has worn off since 1990, so too the predictable nature of election outcomes, as well as a statistically significant fragmentation of interests at the level of individual federal states. While no one denies such remarkable changes in the Berlin Republic, there have remained some issues of contention, especially the ones pertaining to Germany’s role in the European context (Tewes, 1998).
With the unification came the need to define a new role for itself. The newly formed democracies in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) applied subtle diplomatic pressure on Germany that were in conflict with the latter’s conventional role in continental Europe. Although, it was unwilling to give up its traditional role, the signing of the Maastricht Treaty was a new step forward for the unified Germany. It could be said that the treaty was a submissive gesture by the nation and a one-of-its-kind measure in the post world war era. Having said so, one cannot deny the new imperatives that were created through the unification at first and later through the challenges imposed by the CEE. These have impacted the process of policy making in Germany and their redefinition of national priorities. In effect, it could be asserted that the three most influential factors that redefined Germany’s role are: 1.Germany’s domestic policy debate, 2.expectations from CEE and 3.expectations from Western Europe (Lansbury & Pain, 1997).
The coming to an end of the Cold War and the historically unique unification of Germany has given rise for the opening of debate on the direction its foreign policy should take as well as conceptions about its role in the broader European context. In one aspect, the newly devised policies with regard to CEE proved to be a matter of heated public debate. In this context, some political analysts have suggested a more dynamic role for Germany that would “take account of, but be uninhibited by, the country’s Western commitments” (Green, 2008). To put things in perspective, this enduring debate has to be seen from a historical viewpoint. For example,
“As long as the Soviet Union existed, Germany saw it as a guarantor of stability and security in CEE, and thus made it the priority of its Eastern policy. After the Moscow coup in August 1991, this changed. CEE came to be seen as a potentially unstable backyard, which, through immigration, organised crime and environmental risks could threaten the security and well-being of German society. Thus, although German business may have seen CEE primarily in terms of export opportunities and cheap labour, German policy makers saw it primarily in terms of its potential for instability”. (Lansbury & Pain, 1997)
The following statistics on the comparative GDPs of EU nations puts the issue of workers in perspective:
Decomposition of EU and US potential GDP growth rates (%)
1981-1985 1986-1990 1991-1995
GERMANY
Potential GDP 2.0 2.7 2.6
Labour -0.1 0.2 0.0
(Employment) (0.9) (1.1) (0.7)
(Hours worked) (-1.0) (-0.9) (-0.7)
Labour productivity (hourly) 2.1 2.4 2.6
(Capital deepening) (0.7) (0.6) (0.8)
(TFP) (1.4) (1.8) (1.7)
FRANCE
Potential GDP 2.6 2.4 1.8
Labour -0.4 -0.4 -0.3
(Employment) (0.5) (0.2) (0.2)
(Hours worked) (-0.9) (-0.5) (-0.5)
Labour productivity (hourly) 3.0 2.7 2.1
(Capital deepening) (1.0) (1.1) (0.9)
(TFP) (1.9) (1.6) (1.2)
ITALY
Potential GDP 2.7 2.3 1.7
Labour 0.4 0.1 -0.1
(Employment) (0.9) (0.3) (0.0)
(Hours worked) (-0.4) (-0.0) (-0.0)
Labour productivity (hourly) 2.3 2.2 1.8
(Capital deepening) (0.9) (1.0) (0.8)
(TFP) (1.4) (1.2) (1.0)
EURO AREA
Potential GDP 2.3 2.5 2.3
Labour -0.3 -0.1 0.2
(Employment) (0.6) (0.6) (0.6)
(Hours worked) (-0.9) (-0.6) (-0.5)
Labour productivity (hourly) 2.6 2.5 2.1
(Capital deepening) (0.9) (0.9) (0.8)
(TFP) (1.6) (1.6) (1.3)
UK
Potential GDP 2.1 2.6 2.1
Labour 0.0 0.6 0.0
(Employment) (0.4) (0.6) (0.3)
(Hours worked) (-0.4) (-0.1) (-0.3)
Labour productivity (hourly) 2.1 2.0 2.1
(Capital deepening) (0.4) (0.5) (0.5)
(TFP) (1.7) (1.5) (1.7)
EU15
Potential GDP 2.2 2.5 2.2
Labour -0.2 0.1 0.1
(Employment) (0.5) (0.6) (0.6)
(Hours worked) (-0.7) (-0.5) (-0.4)
Labour productivity (hourly) 2.4 2.3 2.1
(Capital deepening) (0.9) (0.8) (0.7)
(TFP) (1.6) (1.5) (1.4)
Source: (Jeffery, 2003)
Germany’s relationship with its western neighbors since the fall of the Berlin wall has been more or less on expected lines. But even here, there is an inherent contradiction, due to the fact that while Germany was expected to approve of the Maastricht Treaty and integrate into the EMU, there is also anticipation from western democracies as to “the strategy Germany would pursue towards CEE, and German support for enlargement towards the East was seen with rather more wariness” (Dyson, 2003). Due to long-standing economic connections, cultural similarity, and other strategic advantages in foreign and domestic policy, it was expected that Germany would be the prominent member of a hypothetical northern bloc in the EU that was meant to counter a southern bloc led by France. But, this concept serves only as the epitome of a general prevalence of incertitude about Germany’s motivation within the EU. Nevertheless, during the early 1990’s, the other members of the European Union were preoccupied with their own domestic problems that Eastern enlargement was not on top of their agendas. In this scenario it is understandable how significant it was that German political leaders addressed the issue at all (Dyson, 2003).
The vast legislative changes that were called upon to accommodate the new realities of a free and mobile European workforce post-integration has brought to light the politics of immigration. That this aspect of the new Germany did not attract greater attention is a little surprising, given its significance throughout the rest of the continent. Immigration has been a very sensitive issue to Germany two principal ways: Firstly, the number of foreign nationals residing in Germany is greater than in any other nation of the European Union. Toward the end of the millennium, the figure stood at over 7.3 million, approximately one tenth of the total population. Secondly, émigré’s in Germany have come from all across the world. During the sixties and seventies, most immigrant groups were from the Mediterranean region (Dyson, 2003). These were predominantly, unskilled or semi-skilled workers, looking for economic opportunities in the recuperating Germany. In contrast, that trend has been replaced in recent decades by the influx of asylum seekers. So the nature of immigrants changed from one of economic refugees to that of political refugees. Consequently, the united Germany’s immigrants form a heterogeneous and electoral significant minority group. Turkish and Yugoslavian asylum seekers form the majority within this minority group. Beyond the obvious challenges brought on by such a composite populace,
“Successive governments have maintained that ‘Germany is not a country of immigration’ (Deutschland ist kein Einwanderungsland), arguing that because Germany did not actively seek permanent new immigration, the established tools of immigration policy (for example, quotas and an inclusive citizenship law) were unnecessary. This received wisdom persisted despite the fact that there was net immigration by foreigners in all except ten years between 1955 and 1999. It was this contradiction which prompted Dietrich Thranhardt to famously characterise Germany as an ‘undeclared immigration country.” (Bomberg, 2002)
Hence, it could be inferred that due to diplomatic imperatives from within and outside, the German nation has gone through remarkable change in its immigration, asylum and citizenship policy. Barring the asylum compromise, several of these modifications to the law have been only moderate. However, more importantly, the combined effect of these small changes has contributed in redefining the thrust of Germany’s policies. Of late, factors attributable to the demographic composition as well as compulsions of free market labour have “confirmed that the continued conceptualisation of Germany as a ‘non-country of immigration’ has thus come to look rather jaded under the Berlin Republic” (Bomberg, 2002).
So, what is becoming clear is that while the newly formed Merkel government came to power on strength of promises that were different to that of Schroder, the mandate was essentially one for domestic policy change. There seem to be a minimal change in the direction and thrust of German foreign policy initiatives in the post unification period. In other words, it could be asserted that significant changes have manifested themselves in German European policy after the fall of the Berlin Wall. As stated above a continuity of “inherited fundamental values” are to be seen across governments and parties along with an increasing inclination to meet short-term objectives (Green, 2001). This is true of both the Schorder period and the ongoing Merkel reign. There could have been a different outcome had Stoiber won the 2002 election. The following table shows how different governments have pursued similar policies resulting in similar outcomes:
Actual GDP growth Population growth
1996-2000 2001-2005 1996-2000 2001-2005
Euro Area 2.7 1.4 0.3 0.6
(Germany) (2.0) (0.6) (0.1) (0.1)
(France) (2.8) (1.5) (0.4) (0.6)
(Italy) (1.9) (0.6) (0.0) (0.6)
Rest of EU15 3.2 2.3 0.3 0.4
(UK) (3.2) (2.4) (0.3) (0.4)
EU15 2.8 1.6 0.3 0.5
EU10 4.3 3.8 -0.2 -0.1
EU25 2.9 1.7 0.2 0.4
US 4.1 2.4 1.2 1.0 (Green, 2001)
GDP per capita1 growth
1996-2000 2001-2005
Euro Area 2.5 0.8
(Germany) (1.9) (0.6)
(France) (2.4) (0.8)
(Italy) (1.9) (0.1)
Rest of EU15 2.9 1.9
(UK) (2.9) (2.0)
EU15 2.5 1.0
EU10 4.5 3.9
EU25 2.7 1.2
US 2.9 1.4
(Source: DG ECFIN's macroeconomic database AMECO.)
A scientific approach to measuring the pros and cons of post-unification German success makes for an interesting discussion. This approach, first conceived under the leadership of Helmut Kohl saw wider application following the rise to power of the Green coalition toward the end of the century. Consequently, Gerhard Schroder released an array of ambitious programme proposals. He proclaimed that under his leadership, “Germany standing up for its national interests will be just as natural as France or Britain standing up for theirs” (Anderson, 1999). Germany’s contribution toward the European Union budget was consistent with such a theme. The meant that Germany needed to do much more to secure its vested interests against its extravagant and expedient partners. This was reflected in many of the policies of the Schroder government. The following are some key diplomatic efforts of this new policy framework:
1. The failed attempt during the German EU Presidency in the early months of 1999 to bring down the German contribution to the EU budget negotiations by inducing other member nations to contribute more.
2. The diplomatic manoeuvres made for the appointment of Gunther Verheugen as the Commissioner of the European Union for enlargement questions, that is, in an area of direct, strategic interest to Germany.
3. The determined attempts of German federal ministries, and private corporate interests to “defend their possessions in the enlargement negotiations on such issues as border controls, environmental standards, social dumping, transitional structural aid, and the flee movement of labour” (Paterson, 2003).
4. Protectionism and the role of Schroder in preventing the implementation of a common European Union decree on the recycling of automobiles.
5. And finally, the unease at the 2000 Nice Summit that institutional upheavals should make sure that Germany retained national ‘weight’ in the post-enlargement union (Anderson, 1999).
Germany and France have historically been close trading partners. Barring the aftermath of the Second World War period, their relationship has grown in confidence yet again. This is a worrying sign for Britain in particular, which is set to lose business opportunities with France as a result. More generally though, the trajectory is for Europe to be less congenial for Germany, and for Germany to be less embedded in European structures. This does not mean that the ambiguous positioning of Germany will destabilize the European Union. On the other hand, “the growing focus on costs and benefits and changing values of Europe are both attempts to rebalance Euro-federalism and create a new, different framework in which a different Germany can continue to feel at home” (Paterson , 2003). In this new European order, existing and future member nations of the EU will have to co-operate and play their respective roles in the process of re-orienting the continent as well as learning to agree that lesser reliance on the Franco-German trading arrangements will help drive further integration.
References:
S. Green et al (2008), The Politics of the New Germany, chapter 9: ‘Germany and the European Union: a European Germany or a German Europe?’.
W. Paterson (1996) ‘Beyond semi-sovereignty: the new Germany in the new Europe’ German Politics 5(2): 167-184.
William E. Paterson (2003), ‘Germany and Europe’, in S. Padgett, William E. Paterson, and Gordon Smith (eds), Developments in German Politics 3, pp. 206—226.
H. Tewes (1998) ‘Between deepening and widening: role conflict in Germany’s enlargement policy’ West European Politics 21(2): 117—133.
J. Anderson (1999) German Unification and the Union of Europe. The Domestic Politics of Integration Policy (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press)
S. Bulmer, A. Maurer and W. Paterson (2001) ‘The European policy-making machinery in the Berlin Republic: hindrance or handmaiden?’ German Politics 10(1) pages 177-206.
Kenneth Dyson (2003), ‘The Europeanization of German Governance’, in S. Padgett,
Bomberg, E. (July 2002). The Europeanisation of Green parties: exploring the EU’s impact. West European Politics, 25, 3. p.29(23).
Tewes, H. (April 1998). Between deepening and widening: role conflict in Germany’s enlargement policy. West European Politics, 21, n2. p.117(17).
Green, S. (Oct 2001). Immigration, asylum and citizenship in Germany: The impact of unification and the Berlin republic. West European Politics, 24, 4. p.82(24).
Jeffery, C., & Paterson, W E (Oct 2003). Germany and European integration: a shifting of tectonic plates. West European Politics, 26, 4. p.59(21
Pain, N., & Lansbury, M. (April 1997). Regional economic integration and foreign direct investment: the case of German investment in Europe. National Institute Economic Review, 160. p.87(1).