For any nation faced with the problem of illegal drug trafficking, the biggest challenge is in reigning in the sources of origin of these drugs. But it is usually the case that the regions of origin have a weak political system and an impotent law enforcement agency. In the case of drug trafficking in the United States, the two primary source nations are Mexico and Columbia. The internal political chaos and the instability induced by rebel militia outfits in Columbia is fairly well documented in print and electronic media. The Mexican political system is fairly democratic and offers a semblance of stability, but its economic backwardness when compared to the United States and Canada, makes it an ideal intermediary destination for traffickers operating from elsewhere. Conventional methods of waging war on drugs have proved inadequate. These methods have tried to attack the supply side and have yielded poor results. As a result,
“drugs are cheaper, purer, and more plentiful than ever. Despite crop-eradication programs, there is substantially more opium poppy and coca cultivated today than there was two decades ago. Attempting to stamp out the supply of drugs is like pushing on a balloon–cut off production in one country and another quickly fills the void.” (Petras, 2002)
The primary method of convincing foreign governments such as Columbia and Mexico would be tactful diplomacy. But going by statistical evidence, the fairly amicable diplomatic ties between these nations and their neighbors (including the United States) had not diminished the scale of narco-trafficking. Resolutions carried through in NAFTA meetings have also had little effect in reducing drug traffic from Mexico. In this scenario, more stringent measures are called for to deter source nations. One such method is the application of economic sanctions. In the second half of the twentieth century, there were several instances when Western democracies successfully applied sanctions against perceived rogue states. While this method may not directly undermine the illegal narcotics network, it would weaken allied industries in the source nation, thereby ultimately reducing drug trafficking. In the case of Mexico, for example, most of its exports are to its North American neighbors. Several special trade agreements and concessions were granted to Mexico through the channel of NAFTA. The destination nations such as the United States can pressurize source nations by stating in unequivocal terms that for the legitimate trade agreements to remain valid the source nations have to take decisive actions toward controlling illegal narco-trafficking (Petras, 2002).
The opposite of economic sanctions, namely financial grants is also a sound measure. In fact, there is already a precedent to this strategy, when the United States government, under the leadership of Bill Clinton, promised Mexico to fund anti-drug trade operations. Reporting on this new announcement from the Clinton Administration, the May 6, 1997 edition of Washington Times reported thus:
“The growing threat of narcotics trafficking to the United States and Mexico will be high on the agenda today, along with other sensitive issues such as immigration and trade, when Mr. Clinton meets with Mexican President Ernesto Zedillo. Just last week, Mexican Attorney General Jorge Madrazo disbanded Mexico’s equivalent of the Drug Enforcement Administration in an acknowledgment that the organization was irreparably corrupt. He let go 1,200 employees. Secretary of State Madeleine K. Albright told Mr. Madrazo that Washington will give Mexico $6 million to help train a new force, State Department spokesman Nicholas Burns said. Department officials said Mexico received $2 million for training last year.” (Strobel, 1997)
But recent statistics on cross border drug trafficking reveals that funding measures such as these have not been very effective. Considering the sheer scale and penetration of the narcotics trade network, $ 6 million grant was inadequate. The new government, under the leadership of President Obama can learn from previous failures and allocate a more substantial grant for source nations. With the failure of traditional methods of combating drug trafficking, newer alternatives should be tried out. One such solution that is making rounds among policy makers is the decriminalization of drug trade. While it does appear to be a reasonable solution, its time has not yet come for implementation. In the meantime, source countries “can lower the toll of both drugs and the war on drugs by pursuing three strategies: embracing the concept of “harm reduction,” rehabilitating the cultivation and sale of coca, and creating a “coalition of the willing” to resist Washington’s simplistic prohibitionist paradigm” (Nadelmann, 2003).
Finally, if all the aforementioned strategies of combating drugs in source nations fail, military intervention measures can be considered. If a whole bloc of nations is involved in the sourcing of drugs then select regions can be targeted in order to break the narcotics supply chain. In such likelihood, the role of the United Nations should not be underestimated. It might be diplomatically convenient and hassle-free to take unilateral military actions against source nations, but gathering the support of the international community will pay dividends in the future. Hence, whatever strategy a nation adopts to combat drugs in source nations, it is always prudent to act with the backing of international majority consensus. This way there would be added pressure on source nations to control illegal activities within their borders. Also, the action (military or diplomatic) would have the added advantage of being recognized as a legitimate one, with the approval of the United Nations.
WORKS CITED
Nadelmann, Ethan. 2003. Addicted to Failure: It’s Time for Latin America to Start Breaking with Washington over the War on Drugs. Foreign Policy, July-August, 94+.
Petras, James. 2002. U.S. Offensive in Latin America: Coups, Retreats, and Radicalization. Monthly Review, May, 15+.
Strobel, Warren P. 1997. U.S. Promises $6 Million to Mexico to Fight Drugs: New Anti-Narcotics Force to Replace Corrupt One. The Washington Times, 6 May, 4.
Weinstein, Ian. 2003. Fifteen Years after the Federal Sentencing Revolution: How Mandatory Minimums Have Undermined Effective and Just Narcotics Sentencing. American Criminal Law Review 40, no. 1: 87+.
G. Serrano, The failing war on drugs in Mexico, retrieved on Monday, September 21, 2009, from <http://trendsupdates.com>
Drug Trafficking in the United States, U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency, posted on Added May, 2004 at <http://www.policyalmanac.org/crime/archive/drug_trafficking.shtml>