Being the same person from one day to the next means to carry forward a whole complex of characteristics across time. This essay will argue that self-identity is constituted of three key components, namely, mind, brain and body. Based on the essays by John Perry and Daniel Dennett, it can loosely be stated that individual identity is primarily a concept of the mind, with the brain and the body providing supporting physiology. Though the role of brain and body are secondary, they are nonetheless essential to self-identity.
Daniel Dennett and John Perry address two facets to the question of identity. Dennett’s preoccupation is with various manifestations of identity during an individual’s lifetime. Perry, on the other hand, treats the idea of the self in the backdrop of mortality and impending death.
Weirob identifies qualities of memory and anticipation as key markers of identity. In the context of mortality, an individual’s afterlife can be spoken of only as a continuation of his collected memories. Moreover, the possibility of meeting future expectations (anticipation) is a precondition to any meaningful sense of afterlife. As Weirob elucidates to his religiously-minded friend Miller, soul as a transferable entity across physical bodies is a vain idea. In other words, if the soul is thought to exist after an individual’s mortal remains have perished, one might as well believe that soul-transplant operations can be done when the individual is alive. The impossibility of the latter suggests the impossibility of the former idea.
I think Weirob’s observations are spot-on. By taking a practical, reasonable approach, readers are disabused of all esoteric speculations on extra-mortal identity. Identity, then, is fairly construed to be a function of body-mind, whose integrity is maintained through mechanisms of bio-chemistry and cognition. It can be summed up as ‘I have a body and therefore I exist’. Moreover, the act of proclaiming the ‘I’ indicates the presence of the mind. Weirob’s reasoned position is quite lucid that it is difficult to contest it on grounds of logic. Hence critics such as Miller and Cohen can only counter by making claims to supernatural phenomena. In other words, the biggest challenge for Weirob’s pragmatic view of self/identity is religious dogma. But this challenge cannot be taken seriously for scholarly analysis.
In Daniel Dennett’s essay, we find many ideas that complement Perry’s assertions. Dennett’s method is similar to that of Perry in that both employ numerous thought experiments to illustrate their points. There are multifarious theoretical ways in which the brain can be separated from the body. That they may not be feasible using current technology is a moot question. One of the main questions answered by Dennett is about the location of individual self-identity across temporal and spatial scales. There are numerous methods through which the distended individual can retain his personhood and function in this abnormal state. The entities for the two brains (Yorick and its computer replica Hubert) and the two bodies (Hamlet and Fortinbras) are shown to function under different permutations and combinations.
Upon studying mind-body relationship through the workings of the four entities, Dennett arrives at the insight that in a brain-transplant operation, it is the donor who retains his identity and not the recipient. In this respect, it is more apt to call it a body-transplant operation. Hence assigning personhood to Hamlet is most dubious. Assigning that status to Yorick is less problematic, but still not fully convincing. Resorting to the generalized claim that ‘Dennett is wherever he thinks he is’ brings its own share of puzzles to the equation. Apart from straightforward questions of legality and rights associated with an individual, numerous moral dilemmas are thrown up by these complexities. For example, can the re-doubled identity of Dennett carry on living two separate lives simultaneously? What if Dennett decides to terminate one copy and live through the other? Does he have the right? Does not it amount to murder? Since these questions are hypothetical and have not yet been encountered in real-life yet, they do not undermine Dennett’s arguments in any significant way.
Finally, Dennett seems to suggest that the soul is essentially a concept of the mind/brain, which is congruent with Perry’s views as well. For example, Perry, in the guise of Weirob, deduces how the body is the central item of self-identification. This is certainly true vis-à-vis how others perceive and recognize an individual when he/she is alive. Even in the case of a paraplegic, she understands and assimilates the fact that the body is paralyzed and reconstructs the identity accordingly. For the paraplegic, identity is wholly a matter of the brain. The body is involved to the extent that the brain is physiologically still a part of her body.
References:
John Perry, A Dialogue on Personal Identity and Immortality, Part 3, Mind and Its Place in Nature, p.395+
Daniel C. Dennett. Where Am I? Lehigh University Resources, retrieved from <http://www.lehigh.edu/~mhb0/Dennett-WhereAmI.pdf> on 6th June 2014