The bigger the size of any institution, the higher the dangers of homogenized laws, rights and regulations, which could be detrimental to maintaining cultural, linguistic and political diversity. Such an arrangement also lacks the immediacy and flexibility of smaller institutions. For example,
“in the context of small homogenous groups, private, informal institutional arrangements enable people to realize the benefits of trade by supporting self-enforcing exchange and preventing potential conflict. These arrangements, such as the use of multilateral punishment among small groups via ostracism, boycott, or the emergence of conflict inhibiting social norms, operate primarily through mechanisms of reputation.” (Leeson, 2007)
In this context, such time-tested methods of trial and justice delivery will be altered under a World Government. It is as yet difficult to ascertain, if these changes are for the collective good or not. Those in favour of World Government argue that it can only be beneficial for, “by introducing formal enforcement then, it is usually reasoned, individuals will be secure in engaging in trade with agents outside their social networks. In this way, formal enforcement promotes cooperation and leads to increasing social wealth.” (Leeson, 2007)
Finally, the larger an institution, the bigger the costs of running it. The costs of running a world government can be broken down into three categories. Foremost is the costs related to bureaucracy and infrastructure. In the first category, we can also add the cost of organizing collective action, which includes “(a) the decision-making costs of arriving at the specific set of rules the state is to enforce (1) and (b) the external costs of collective decision-making, which result from the fact that the group may sometimes makes choices that are contrary to the interests of the individual. The organizational cost of government thus depends upon, in addition to other possible factors, the form of government or decision-making process that is followed in determining what set of rules the state is to enforce.” (Leeson, 2007) Since democracy is the best method for ensuring fair representation and participation, it adds to the cost of running the government as well. In other words, the democratic world government would require
“the consensus of multiple citizens rather than the will of one individual, the decision-making cost of democracy is higher than that of an authoritarian arrangement. Clearly, how much higher this cost is depends upon how difficult it is to create laws under democracy. Thus, a democratic government that requires potential rules to receive a supermajority of its citizens’ approval before becoming effective, for example, will have a higher decision-making cost than one that requires only majority approval.” (Leeson, 2007)
• Craig, C. (2008). The Resurgent Idea of World Government. Ethics & International Affairs,22(2), 133+. Print.
• Cronkite, W. (2000, Summer). The Case for Democratic World Government. Earth Island Journal, 15(2), 45. Print.
• Ewing, A. C. (1947). The Individual, the State and World Government. New York: The Macmillan Company. Retrieved from http://www.questia.com
• The Goal of World Government. (2005, February 7). The New American, 21(3), 22. Print.
• Grigg, W. N. (2005, July 11). World Government, Take Three: Those Who Wish to Empower a Global Institution with the Authority to Govern All People and Countries Have Suffered Repeated Setbacks, but They Are Forging Ahead. The New American,21(14), 17+. Print.
• Leeson, P. T. (2007). Does Globalization Require Global Government? Indian Journal of Economics and Business, 7+. Print.
• Samuels, W. J. (2001). The Political-Economic Logic of World Governance. Review of Social Economy, 59(3), 273. Print.
• Suter, K. (2003). Global Order and Global Disorder: Globalization and the Nation-State. Westport, CT: Praeger. Print.